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James Lyon, Serbia and the Balkan Front, 1914:  
The Outbreak of the Great War. Bloomsbury: London 2015, 306 p.
Reviewed by Miloš Vojinović*
James Lyon’s book has been eagerly awaited 
by the historians of the First World War. As 
Lyon himself points out, the historiography 
of the Great War, after dealing with the 
events from the summer of 1914, usually los-
es sight of the Balkan front in the remaining 
months of 1914. If we look at the Cambridge 
History of the First World War: Vol. 1 Global 
War edited by Jay Winter, we can see that 
the Balkan front was not dealt with. Lyon 
offers several reasons why the Balkan front 
in 1914 should not be omitted from general 
overviews of the First World War. Firstly, 
relative to its size, it was as bloody as the 
Western or Eastern fronts. Five months of 
fighting in the relatively small northwestern 
quarter of the Kingdom of Serbia brought 
death, serious wounds, and captivity to 
273,000 Habsburg soldiers and to 165,000 
Serbian soldiers (pp. 234–236). Moreover, 
the Balkan front did not have to wait for 
1919 and Spanish flu – at the end of 1914 
typhus, diphtheria, and cholera were already 
taking lives. Secondly, Lyon demonstrates 
that events on the Balkan front were in fo-
cus of diplomacy of all belligerents, and of 
some countries that were weighing whether 
to enter the war or not. Finally, what is of 
special importance, the outcome of the war 
operations in the Balkans in 1914 had seri-
ous consequences for the Habsburg defeats 
by the Russian Empire on the Eastern front 
(pp. 4, 138, 149–150, 178–179).
The book is based on the author’s PhD 
thesis defended at the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, in 1995, before a dis-
sertation committee which included Bariša 
Krekić and Dimitrije Djordjević. The pub-
lished version also drew upon works pub-
lished after 1995. Lyon’s fluency in Serbian 
enabled him to research Serbian primary 
sources from the period, which he had done 
in a rather meticulous and diligent way. The 
detail in which the battles and troop move-
ments are presented can even be described 
as burdensome by those who are not enthu-
siastic about military history. The narrative 
starts with chapters that are supposed to ex-
plain the origins of the conflict between the 
Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary, 
and ends with the last days of 1914, when 
hostilities ceased after the Battle of the Kol-
ubara and the liberation of Belgrade.
Lyon states in the introduction that 
one of his goals is to demonstrate that 
most Western historians, due to the lack 
of knowledge of Serbian sources, have ac-
cepted the premise set forth by former 
Habsburg officers and politicians anxious to 
justify themselves, that the Habsburg army 
had been in a poor state whereas their foe 
had been better equipped and supplied (p. 
2). Lyon is not the first to claim this. Histo-
rian Graydon A. Tunstall has spoken about 
“Habsburg command conspiracy”, which 
was intended to hide the true reasons for the 
defeats of Habsburg armies in 1914.1 Lyon 
provides a well-substantiated refutation of 
such claims, showing that the Habsburg 
troops outnumbered the Serbs by a ratio 
that went up to 3 to 1. Moreover, he clearly 
shows that the Habsburg forces were better 
equipped, that they had up to three times as 
many guns as the Serbs, and that they never 
faced problems with the lack of equipment, 
clothing and ammunition comparable to 
those that the Serbian forces did.
The first three chapters (“A Sunday in 
Sarajevo”; “A third Balkan war?”; “Parallel 
structures and hostile neighbors”) cover the 
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1 G. A. Tunstall, “The Habsburg Command 
Conspiracy: The Austrian falsification of his-
toriography on the outbreak of World War I”, 
Austrian History Yearbook 27 (1996), 181–198. 
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time before hostilities began. Lyon claims 
that “In 1914, influential elements in both 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia pressed dia-
metrically opposed geopolitical and national 
aims that contemplated future programs of 
territorial expansion at each other’s expense” 
(p. 2). What remains unclear is why Lyon 
has chosen to base his conclusions about 
some of the crucial events only on the work 
of Luigi Albertini. Being well acquainted 
with Yugoslav and Serbian historiography, 
he should have had no trouble noticing that 
some of Albertini’s conclusions, at times 
based only on interviews made by his as-
sistants after the Great War, have been dis-
proved by the subsequent research based on 
the documentary material made available by 
the opening of archives.
Using Albertini’s work as a source, Lyon 
claims that it appears that Gavrilo Princip 
was a fully inducted Black Hand member 
(p. 58), a notion which is not supported 
by any primary source or any research into 
Young Bosnia. He also argues that “Vienna’s 
visible progress transforming and modern-
izing Bosnia-Herzegovina represented a 
threat to Serbia’s national program”, espe-
cially because, Lyon adds, Franz Ferdinand’s 
triune ideas were an obstacle to the Greater 
Serbian national project (p. 56). What is 
questionable here is not just the fact that 
for Franz Ferdinand the triune solution 
was nothing more than an idea he briefly 
contemplated and discarded,2 and that it is 
uncertain whether Serbian politicians knew 
about his plans at all. The main problem 
is that no evidence is given to support the 
claim that Austrian policy in Bosnia was a 
“threat to Serbia’s national program”. In fact, 
quite the opposite is true. As time went by, 
and especially after the Balkan wars, Ser-
bia appeared more and more attractive to 
the South Slavs, and not just to those in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to those 
2 J.-P. Bled, François-Ferdinand d’Autriche (Pa-
ris: Tallandier, 2012), 230–233.
inhabiting other parts of the Habsburg 
Monarchy.
It seems that Lyon devoted more time 
to researching hostilities than events that 
had preceded the war. The chapters describ-
ing the period before the war contain several 
factual errors. Belgrade did not become the 
capital of the Principality of Serbia after 
the rebellions of 1804 and 1815 (p. 91). The 
Serb-Croat Coalition in Croatia had not 
been in power from 1903 (p. 23), it did not 
even exist in 1903. Serbian chetnik units in 
Macedonia were not formed in 1902, and 
they were not formed by the Serbian state 
(p. 43). Lyon writes that in 1913 Dragu-
tin Dimitrijević Apis maintained contact 
with Prime Minister Pašić via Milovan 
Milovanović. (pp. 58–59). It was hardly pos-
sible since Milovanović had died in 1912.
The major part of this book is devoted 
to war operations conducted from August 
to December 1914. The portrayal of the 
military preparedness of both the Kingdom 
of Serbia and Austria-Hungary is extensive 
and convincing. The descriptions of the bat-
tles and of the generals who led them are de-
tailed and precise. The understanding of the 
battles and troop movements is made easier 
with six maps.
Lyon writes that at the beginning of the 
war Serbian army was “half uniformed and 
poorly equipped”, while the Austro-Hun-
garian army “entered battle well-equipped, 
rested and possessing ample supplies” (pp. 
88–89). He concludes that on paper the 
outcome seemed predetermined (p. 89). In 
the following chapters, Lyon depicts the 
Battle of Mt Cer, the Battle of the Drina 
with a special focus on the Battle of Mačkov 
Kamen, the Serbian invasion of Srem, and 
the Battle of the Kolubara.
Readers can follow parallel dynam-
ics of decision-making processes in both 
General Staffs. While Oskar Potiorek set 
the imperative of fast victory in Serbia in 
order to be able to fight the Russian army 
with full capacity (pp. 116, 123), at the same 
time “Serbia’s General Staff understood the 
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strategic importance of the Morava-Vardar 
corridor, as well as the defensive advantages 
afforded by the country’s mountains and riv-
ers, and incorporated these natural obstacles 
into their defensive plans” (p. 109). Lyon 
argues that one of the reasons of Austro-
Hungarian defeat and Serbian victory was 
the fact that, unlike the plans of the Habs-
burg army which were made almost exclu-
sively in consequence of political impera-
tives, the Serbian generals made plans with 
military considerations foremost in mind 
(pp. 239–241). In this respect, Lyon praises 
General Putnik’s decision to leave Belgrade 
undefended, since its defence did not have 
any military logic behind it. At the same 
time, Lyon shows that the only military de-
cision that the Serbian generals made as a 
result of political pressure proved to be very 
costly: i.e. the decision to invade Srem taken 
after Russian and French repeated request 
to Serbia to attack Austria-Hungary on the 
latter’s own soil.
What sets Lyon apart from some Ser-
bian historians is his insistence on the im-
portance of the role played by General Pavle 
Jurišić-Šturm: “Highly capable, he [Šturm] 
held what would turn out to be the most 
crucial assignment of any Serbian general in 
1914” (p. 111). Lyon shows that Šturm’s III 
Army was “by far the weakest” of the Ser-
bian armies (p. 111); however, Šturm led it 
ingenuously against much stronger enemy 
forces, furthermore, he acted even when 
his superior, General Putnik, was hesitant 
about what should be done (p. 127). Šturm 
held his ground on Mt Cer in a way which 
Lyon describes as heroic (p. 143), and, dur-
ing the most difficult days for the Serbian 
forces at the Battle of the Kolubara, “In 
contrast to other Serbian commanders, 
Jurišić-Šturm reported that even though he 
lacked artillery ammunition, telephone and 
telegraph cables for communications, and 
all units were seriously under strength, he 
could attack the following day” (p. 211).
The closing chapters deal with the Battle 
of the Drina, the short Serbian invasions of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Srem, and, finally, 
with the Battle of the Kolubara. The battles 
are presented on various levels, mainly from 
the viewpoint of military history, with a fo-
cus on tactics, strategies, usage of weapons, 
and logistics. The author also provides an 
account of the diplomatic activities taking 
place in the background of the field of bat-
tle, the best example of which is the chapter 
about the Battle of the Kolubara and the 
efforts of the Serbian government to pro-
cure ammunition and supplies. As in many 
other books about the Great War, the read-
ers can learn about the horrors that soldiers 
had gone through, and about the appalling 
ferocity of Habsburg troops towards local 
civilian population.
Like several Serbian historians, Lyon 
argues that General Putnik helped the Hab-
sburg troops to escape encirclements, since 
he acted slowly or stopped the progress of 
Serbian advancement on more than one oc-
casion (pp. 144, 223). However, in conclu-
sion Lyon argues that “The primary reason 
for Serbia’s success was brilliant strategy by 
the Chief of Serbia’s High Command, Vo-
jvoda Radomir Putnik, and numerous offic-
ers willing to take the initiative on the field 
of battle” (p. 241). Lyon also adds: “Other 
reasons for success include good general-
ship, the army’s tactical doctrines, battle-
field experience from the Balkan wars, and 
the psychological makeup of the Serbian 
soldier.” Analyzing the reasons for the Hab-
sburg defeat, the author claims that it was 
the consequence of poor strategic planning 
and leadership on the one side, and lack of 
tactical integration of artillery and infantry 
doctrine on the other.
The chapters of this book devoted to the 
war in the Balkans in 1914 make a fine con-
tribution to the historiography of the Great 
War, and they will, without a doubt, fill the 
gap that has hitherto existed in it. 
